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The federal rehabilitation loan and grant program
(Sections 312 and 115) is designed to provide direct govern-
ment subsidies and financing to owners and tenants who could
not otherwise afford the cost of housing improvement. The
thesis examines the operation of the program in three Boston
neighborhoods, where loans and grants form a critical element
in the ongoing urban renewal strategy. Of major interest is
the way in which the program has worked to distribute the
costs and benefits of rehabilitation among various groups
and the factors in each neighborhood which have influenced
its operation. The thesis evaluates whether the renewal
plans' assumption that rehabilitation would benefit existing
low and moderate income area residents is consistent with
actual loan and grant experience.
In general, while loans and grants have not been widely
used, the grant program has extended the benefits of reha-
bilitation to a limited number of residents in great need of
assistance. But only in Washington Park have 312 loans
facilitated the kind of minimal rehabilitation from which
low aad moderate income residents stand to benefit. The
use of loans by middle-class aspiring Charlestow-m owners
to achieve rehabilitation well above code level has not
yet imposed substantial costs on low income tenants, but
may do so in the long run. In the South End, the program
has facilitated luxury rehabilitation and conversion of
low and moderate rent housing for use by affluent groups.
The outcome of the loan and grant program in each
neighborhood is determined largely by the economic and
social contexts in which it operates. But the policies and
practices of the local administering agency (Boston Redevelop-
ment Authority) have, in the past, reinforced trends. which
impose costs on less affluent residents.
Finally, the loan and grant recipients have received
limited benefits from the quality of public intervention
in the rehabilitation process. The benefits of public
rehabilitation assistance have also been somewhat unevenly
distributed in favor of the more affluent and sophisticated
recipients.
The loan and grant experience significantly undermines
the validity of original rehabilitation assumptions. A
recent BRA decision to give low and moderate income owners
priority is a step in the tight direction; but broader changes
in rehabilitation policy and administration are suggested.
Thesis Supervisor: Lisa R. Peattie
Title: Associate Professor of Anthropology
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4I Evolution of the Rehabilita.,tion Loan and Grant Program
Federal Role in Housing Rehabilitation
Residential rehabilitation has been. an object of
federal concern for more than 30 years. The government's
earliest venture into rehabilitation assistance was a
program of direct lending for home improvement, established
in 1933 through the Homeowners' Loan Corporation. Direct
lending, however, was soon eclipsed by the concept of
federal insurance for private rehabilitation loans, which
began with the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA)
Title I program in 1934.
The objective of these early programs was merely to
improve individual structures on a geographically random
basis. Tlut in 1954, rehabilitat ion was expanded into
a strategy for neighborhood upgrading, and for the first
time a comprehensive set of rehabilitation aids were
organized to implement this goal. New programs , such as
FHA Section 220, were designed to extend the scope of
rehab feasibility by providing federal guarantees for
long term, low downpayment financing.
Basically, neighborhood conservation was seen as an
alternative to the clearance strategy associated with
urban renewal, which had proven politically and economically
unpalatable during the 1950's. According to the wisdom
of the ti 5es, neighborhood relihbilitation would be a
cheaper, faster, and more humane method of providing
decent housing, without destroying the physical fabric
and social integrity of neighborhoods. A cardinal
principle of rehabilitation was that it should serve
and benefit area residents, both owners and tenants.
According to a former urban renewal comimissioner, 2
(T)he whole intent of the rehabilitation
prograiN is to have existing property owners
rehabilitate their property...(T)he idea is
to get the existing property owner to try and
keep the people who are there now in the
property and rehabilitate without displace-
ment...Pasically, the idea...is to try to
rehabilitate the houses in the area for the
people who live there.
At the same time, various political, economic,
and social forces affecting the rehabilitation process
often seemed at variance with this goal. Local tax
base considerations and FHA's preoccupation with
financial soundness demanded a level of replacement
which made rehabilitation resemble new construction.
Lending institutions, reluctant to invest in deteriorated
areas, imposed stringent credit standards on borrowers;
and by the mid 1960's, FHA interest rates were escalating
to increasingly high levels. Additionally, the select
group of owners who could afford to rehabilitate under
available programs often had little interest in retaining
their tenants when market conditions permitted rehabilitation
for higher income groups.
Finally, the scarcity of reliable general contractors
in the rehabilitation field and the characteristic unpre-
dictability of rehab work often made it difficult to get
OW
a good job done at reasonable cost.' Not infrequently,
"suede shoe operators" were able to take advantage of
the limited competition by charging high rates for
inferior workmanship--a factor which perhaps helped
to dampen the enthusiasm of unsophisticated owners for
rehabilitation work.3
As a result of these problems, the concept of
neighborhood conservation as a strategy for improving
the housing situations of renewal area residents was
gradually being undermined. By 1964, only 500 reha-
bilitation loans had been secured under the Section 220
program. Moreover, it was becoming clear that the
rehabilitation process could impose costs rather than
benefits on low and moderate income owners and tenants.
Rehabilitation Loans and Grants: Basic Provisions and
Legislative History
The Section 312 rehabilitation loan 'and Section 115
grant programs, enacted, respectively, in 19 64 and 1965,
were intended to remedy some of the inadequacies of-
existing financing mechanisms. Under the new programs,
rehabilitation assistance was to be made available to
eligible owners in the form of direct federal grants and
3fo loans, repayable over a 20-year period.. In line
with the neighborhood renewal strategy, loans and grants
were initially provided only to owners in urban renewal
or federally-assisted code enforcement areas.*
*
Subsequently, loans and grants have been extended to
owners in "certified areas," designated for future relabili-
tation treatient, and in areas covered by statewide insurance
plans, under certain conditions.
The significance of the loan and grant program lies,
first, in the federal recognition of the need for rehabili-
tation subsidies to extend the benefits of rehabilitation
to less affluent owners and tenants. Second, the program
marked a return to the concept of direct government
rehabilitation financing, though on a small scale. Finally,
the program greatly enhanced the role of the local
public agency (LPA) in rehabilitation assistance. Through
its assumption of loan origination and processing functions
and its involvement in work write-ups, contractor selection,
and work supervision, the LPA was now in a position to
exercise some control over the distribution of rehab
5
funds and over the nature and quality of.work to be done.
The basic design of the loan and grant program
suggests an intent on the part of its legislative authors
not only to bypass existing private finIncing channels
but also to minimiize the role of FBA in the rehabilitation
field.* Not surprisingly, the 312 loan approach was
resisted for a time by the Housing and Home Finance Agency
(predecessor of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development), which advocatedl a more traditional subsidized
6loan insurance program under FHlA administration.
*Initially, FHA did exercise application review and
property inspection functions for 312 loans, but in 1967
its jurisdiction in this regard was limited to buildings
with 5 or more units. Its only renaining role with respect
to smaller properties is to appraise the "as-is" property
value for any loan over "-3500. (See "Hebabilitation Financing, 1t
- Progra::s Handbook, Departim.ent of Hiouisi: g and Urban
Developmenlt, October, 1968. )
z -R
The general purpose of the loan program, as
initially enacted, was "to assist rehabilitation...
and thereby reduce the need for demolition and
removal of structures which could be rehabilitated" 7
and to
provide a source of financing to those
persons...who are presently unable to
undertake necessary rehabilitation of their
property because they cannot obtain loans in
sufficient amounts or at such terms as they
can. afford to carry.
Similarly, the grant program was intended "to avoid
displacement of owners with no other means of financing
needed repairs.
The legislative and administrative evolution .of the
program over the past six years reflects several shifts
in the specific interpretation of this purpose, which
have influenced the program's implementation. Two issues
that have dominated the legislative history concern.-.
0," the appropriate constituency to be served and the
appropriate rehabilitation level to require or encourage.
And since the required level and cost of rehab strongly
influence the nature of the program's ~constituency, while
constituency selection also affects the level of rehab
undertaken, the interrelationship of these two concerns
is readily apparent.
The basic provisions of the program, and the way in
which they have evolved over time, are set forth below. 1 0
Elg:Libility. Grant eli gibility has been restricted
consistently to owner occupants with incom less than
$3000, or with monthly housing expenses exceeding
250 of income. To preclude owners with substantial
resources from qua-lifying under the latter provision,
the regulations stipulate that grants are intended
only for "hardship cases," for the purpose of avoiding
unnecessary displacement.
Loan eligibility was limited initially to owhers
unable to secure rehabilitation financing from other
sources on "reasonable" terms--provided the applicant
12
evidenced capacity to repay the loan. Subsequently,
eligibility was exterded to .any owner who could not secure
financing on "comparable" terits, thereby widen.ing the
program's potential constituency. to virtually anyone
13
owning property in the designated area.
In 1968, however, Congressional concern that the
benefits of limited rehabilitation funds were bypassing
owners in greatest need of assistance led to an aimendement
restricting future eligibility to low and moderate income
14
owners. Such owners must have incomes below the allowed
limits for FHA Section 221d3 housing, which vary regionally
and with family size. For instance, in E3oston the current
maximum annual income limits are as follows:






In 1969, renewed concern with diminishing rehab volune
led to a modification of this provision, whereby low and
moderate income owners would receive priority for 312 loans. 1 5
It should be noted that proposed changes in the 312
loan program contained in the 1970 Housing Bill could sub-
stantially affect the issue of constituency. The new bill
contemplates a shift to a variable interest rate--according
to income--and a fixed maximum rate for investor-owners
(non-owner occupants). At the same time, the maximum loan
16
term would be increased from 20 to 30 years. These
changes, if enacted, would re-assert the principle of
rehabilitation aid for all owners, but on terms which
would offer greater assistance with increasing financial need.
Rehabilitation Level. The required level of rehabili-
tation under the loan and grant program has remained minimal,
especially in contrast to the standards imposed under FHlA
rehabilitation programs. On the other hand, the permiissable
level of rehab which can be achieved with loans and grants
has steadily increased.
Specifically, grant recipients must conform their
properties to area property rehabilitation standards (PRS).
In federally-assisted code areas, these are the standards
prescribed by local housing, building, and related ordinances.
In urban renewal areas, PRS are defined as "t1-e combination
of code standards and rehabilitation requirements which are
established for properties to be retained in the rehabilitation
area." In practice, however, cities with comprehensive
code requirements may not differen-tiate between the two
1l
sets of standards; for instance, PRS in Boston's urban
renewal areas are the state sanitary code, local building
and zoning codes, and other.related ordinances.
If the owner cannot bring his property into compliance
with PRS on the basis of grant funds alone, he must supple-
mient the grant with a loan, or forego the grant entirely.
Since 1968, the perissable level of rehab beyond
PRS has been extended to include the cost of correcting
"incipient violations," and providing basic equipment,
such as a stove, if the existing equipment is unsafe or
unsanitary.1 9
Loan recipients are also required, at a iinimun, to
conform their properties to PRS. But since 1968, a 312
loan may also be used to cover the cost of (1) providing
basic equipment, as above; (2) acquiring additional
land, under certain conditions; (3) property conversion,
if necessary to i.ake rehabilitation feasible; (4) meeting
20
urban renewal "objectives," in urban renewal areas. Such
objectives are typically designed to support a level of
rehab above the local code requirements. For instance,
urban renewal objectives in Boston are:2 1
to prevent the spread of blight...
to restore deteriorating areas to sound condition;
to improve the quality of individual properties;
to create decent, safe, and sanitary structures,
providing the greatest degree of amenity, con-
venience, usefulness, and livability for the
occupants and users.
Additionally, loan recipionts may undertake "general
property i.prove, ents" in an amount not exceeding 4or of
the cost of other items (20'2 for investors). This "catch-
12
all" category includes 2 2
additions, enlargements, renovation and re-
riodeling, such as; the provision for or enlarge-
ment of rooms, garage, or fence; the finishing
of spaces within the property such as an attic,
porch, or basement; remodeling kitchens, including
the purchase and installation of a dishwasher...
and garbage disposal; and the purchase and instal-
lation of incinerators and central air condi-
tioning.
It should be noted that the provision for calculating
the general property improvements allowance as a percentage
of all other costs per Mits a considerably higher level
of rehabilitation under 312 in urban renewal areas than
in code enforcem:ient areas. This is because the cost base
in urban renewal areas includes the cost of meeting urban
renewal objectives which, as noted above, may-beyused to
justify a number of additional items.
Cost Limitations. The level of rehabilitation achievable
is also influeced by various limitations on the cost of
rehabilitation which can be financed with a loan or grant.
In general, cost limitations have increased over the life
of the program, reflecting the increasing level of rehab
work permitted. The imaximum grant aIount has wore than
doubled since the beginning of the program, from $1500
to $3500 per structure. The maximum loan anourit has
increased from $10,000 to $12,000 per dwelling unit,
and is now up to $17,400 per unit in high cost areas such
as Boston. The loan amount is also limited by the amount
of existing debt on the property and the loan-to-value
If23
ratio ( a raximum of 97c for resident owners).
TRent Regulation. The extent of rent regulation per-
mitted under the program is also relevant to the level of
13
rehab achievable and, therefore, to the nature of the
constituency served. Rent regulation by HUD is authorized
only for properties conitaining 12 or more units, where
24
rehabilitation costs exceed $5000 per unit. The only
additional requirement which might operate to limit
rent increases in smaller buildings is a general stipula-
tion that rehabilitation beyond the mandatory PRS level
does not justify rent increases beyond the means of typical
area residents 25
Refinancing. The extent to which 312 loans can be
used to refinance existing debt is another factor which
may influence both the rehabilitation level and the nature
of constituency served. In theory, refinancing allows an
owner to achieve a certain level of rehabilitation at
the saie or reduced monthly debt service. Presumably,
it also provides for rent stability or even rent reduc-
tions for some tenants. While the 312 legislation does
permit refinancing, administratively this provision has
been restricted to owner occupants, and only to those
whose monthly carrying costs on existing debt plus the
rehabilitation loan would exceed 20% of iricome.2 6
Progress to Date
Table I (see Appendix) illustrates the cumtulative
progress of the rehabilitation loan and grant program
nationally.
hile the pace of Iboth loan and grant activity has
increased considerably in recent years, the olvious
disparity between loan and grant achievements is of some
interest. In part, this reflects significant differences
in program adi nistration which will be examined subsequently.
But it should be noted here that while grants are financed
out of the urban renewal, code erforcemvent, or similar
project funds allocated to particular localities, loan
financing-is dependent upon annual appropriations to
a 312 "revolving fund" which have failed to keep pace
with increased program demand. In fiscal 1969, 312 funds
were fully committed 3 months before the end of the year.27
Proposed appropriations for fiscal 1971 are the lowest ever,
28
at ,35 million.
While the increasing level of loan repayments should
eventually make the revolving fund self-sustaining, the
312 program may well have achieved its maxiium annual
volume. The proposed 1970 Housirg 3ill, which places the
program on the new terms noted earlier, also contemplates
a major shift of rehabilitation activity to a comprehensive
subsidy program which relies on the traditional FHjA insurance
29
approach. In a sense, then, the 312-half of the loan and
grant program now stands at some sort.of crossroads. Thus
a review of the program's achievements seems appropriate
at this juncture.
Thesis Framework
The intent of this thesis is to examine the experience
of one rmajor city---3oston-- with rehabilitation loans and
ants. The analysis will focus on three nei:borhoods--
Mashington Park, Charles toin, and the South End--in which
loans and grants are a critical element in the ongoing
15
renewal strategy. The thesis is conceived as a case study
of the way in which one particular government housing
program has operated, and of how the the costs and
benefits of the program have been distributed to various
population groups.
It should be noted at the outset that the scope of
the study is restricted to loans and grants in a
context. While somLe of the findings may be applicable to
code enforce;ent or other situations in which loans and
grants are used, the variations in federal regulations,
as noted earlier, may influence substantially different
outcomes.
In evaluating -the use of rehabilitation loans and
grants in Boston, the following approach will be taken.
First, the renewal strategy and the econo. ic , social,
and political-administrative factors providing the con text
for loan and grant rehabilitati on in each neighborhood
will be examined. The actual experience with the program
will then be analyzed in terms of these factors, and the
implications for the original neighborhood renewal strategr
assessed. Statistical data compiled from Boston Redevelop-
m;ent Authority site office records and interviews with BRA
staff, loon and grant recipients, and others faiiliar
with the three neighborhoods are the major sources of
information upon which the analysis is based.
.Before co sidering some of the specific. isstes asso-
ciated with loan and vrant rehabilitation which this thesis
will ad(dress, it is necessary to examine briefly the. Boston
rehabilitat ion context in which the program is operating.
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II The Boston Context for Loan and Grant Rehabilitation
Overview: Boston's Neighborhood Renewal Strategy
pehabilitation has been the focal point of Boston's
urban renewal strategy since the early 1960's. Almost
three quarters (32,000) of the 47,000 units in areas
to be renewed by 1975 are slated for rehabilitation,
as compared to 15,000-16,000 units which will be
newly constructed. 1
The objectives of the rehabilitation program have
frequently been stated in terms of physical and economic
improvement. According to a ERA Working Paper on Rehabili-
tation prepared in 1964,2
(0)ur policy in the neighborhoods must be
to modernize the existing housing stock and its
environment so that Boston's neighborhoods can
compete effectively with newer suburban dwellings.
The specific goals of rehabilitation, according to this
3document, are
1. to save the neighborhoods and (their) housing
stock...
2. to take the existing housing stock and rehabili-
tate it to an attractive condition...
3. to attract new investment which will provide
further leverage toward improved city services,
toward a progressive community, and toward strength-
ening the tax base...
Elsewhere in BRA publications, rehabilitation is
considered a major resource for meeting the housing needs
4
of low and moderate incomve families:
(T)he city's substandard housing, particularly for
low income families, is -proposed to be predominant-
ly upgraded through rehabilitation rather than
replaced by new construction.
Basic to the renewal strategy is the assumption that
rehabilitation will, at least, serve and benefit the existing
17
residents of renewal neighborhoods, both owners and tenants.5
The imajor thrust of the rencwal program in
residential areas is to stimulate the retention
and rehabilitation of existing structures with
no or only modest increases in ren-tal and
carrying costs to the occupants.
The economic assumptions underlying this proposition of
carrying cost and rent stability are:
(1) that rehabilitation costs will be minimal, reflecting
the essentially minimal nature of rehabilitation work required
to meet property rehabilitation standards (see p. 11).
This determination is based on surveys of typical
properties in each area, conducted by the 3RA and FHA.
($) that rehabilitation financing-, including oppor-
tunties for refinancing existing debt,.will be available
on ter;:;s sufficienDtly liberal to enable area owners and
tenants to afford monthly amortization. Initially, FHTA
220 financing was seen as the major tool to achieve this
end, but early experience with FIA and lender intransi-
gience led to some rethinking in this regard. 6By 1967,
primary reliance was placed on direct grants and 3!o loans
"fto keep rental and cost increases due to rehabilitation
to a minimum." 7
In the interest of further reducing the monthly cost
impact of rehabilitation, the City also announced an assess-
rent freeze covering a wide range of rehabilitation improve-
ments.8 While there could be no permanent protection against
eventual re-assessment over the course of time, individual
owners might at least avoid higher tax payments as an immediate
consec uence of rehabilitationi work.
In addition, a variety of social assum-ptions are
implicit in the notion that rehabilitation will serve and
benefit area residents. First, existing resident owners must
want to rehabilitate--a factor which dep-ends on such
variables as the extent of the owner's- social ties to
the neighborhood, the value he assigns to. home improvem.ient
in relation to other budget priorities, his view of rehabili-
tation costs in relation to possible limitations of the area,
his age, and his other housing options. Secondly, existing
owners must want to rehabilitate for existing tenants,
rather than for other social or econoic groups if the
market perrmits.
These economic and social assumptions constituted the
grounds upon which the neighborhood renewal strategy could
be sold to area residents. The extent to which they have
been validated by actual rehabilitation experience, at
least with respect to the loan and grant program, is the
critical issue under investigation here. And while the
rehabilitation strategy as a whole cannot be evaluated
solely on the merits of loan and grant experience, it is
clear that the ability of this program to deal with the
social and economic problems of rehab exclusion is critical
to the.success of the entire rehabilitation effort.
In evaluating the loan and grant experience, four
basic issues will be considered. First, to what extent
19
has the program been utilized in each area, and how has
loan and grant assistance been distributed aroiing various
groups? Second, what level of rehabilitation and costs
have been achieved, and what do these findings reflect
or imply about the constituency served? Third, what is
the probable impact of loan and grant rehabilitation on rent
levels and displacement? Finally, to what extent have
those served benefitted from the special nature of public
intervention in the rehabilitation process? In general,
hiave loans and grants significantly extended the benefits of
rehabilitation to the traditional victims of rehab exclusion
-- i.e. low and moderate income owners and tenants--or have
they provided incrcased benefits to groups who have tradi-
tionally gained from rehabilitation in the past? Of parti-
cular interest in this analsis are the social, econom iic,
,and political-admiistrative variables in each neig;hborhood
which have influenced the programn 's outcome.
It should be emphasized that in m.aking these determi-ina-
tions, both the short and long range implications of the loan
and grant experience must be considered. For instance, even
where loans and grants are now extending the benefits
of rehabilitation to low and moderate income residents
at little added cost, the market context in which the
program operates may make it difficult to sustain these
benefits in the long run.
The Strategy in_ the_ Neighborhoods
Washington Park
Sociologically, the most significant fact about Washington
Park is the dramatic shift in racial composition-- from 70%
white to 707,% black--which occurrod in the area in the decade
9
prior. to renewal. Beyond the degree of increasing racial
homogeneity reflected in this statistic, the area is one
of significant socio-economic contrast. In addition to the
smail group of white, mostly elderly, residents, the black
population represents at least three groups, characterized
by Keyes as the affluent elite, the blue-collar wage
earners, and the black proletariat.10
Members of the elite, highly organized and capable,
own and occupy property in the relatively exclusive
part of the district known as Upper Roxbury. The blue
collar workers, resident owners of the lilore deteriorated
Middle Roxbury three-deckers, tend to display middle
class aspirations and life styles while sharing the
economic insecurity of the proletariat. This latter group
consists primarily of low income, low status tenants, rela-
tively new to the area, and includes a high proportion of
welfare recipients. The lack of stability in their housing
situations is reflected in the fact that more than two-thirds
of Middle Roxbury's tenants had rent-income ratios exceeding
25% in 1960.11
The Washington Park renewal strategy proposed a consi-
derable amount of clearance, reflecting the coma on desire
of the elite, blue collar owners, and the BRA to rid the
area off blighting" influences. These included both the
deteriorated physical structure-s and their "socially unde-
sirable" tenant occupants, who were considered a threat to
the area's stability. Basicallly, urban rcinewal was intended
20
to stabilize and upgrade Washington Park as a racially
integrated but econoriically homnogeneous middle class
community.12
On the other hand, the implications of the rehabilita-
tion strategy per se were less clear-cut. Typical property
surveys found the cost of rehabilitation to be minimal--
no higher than $5000 for a three-decker in poor condition
(see Table II). The average increase in monthly debt service
with liberal financing was estim-ated at 87.87 per structure. 1 3
Thus, with rent stability all but guaranteed, the assump-
tion seemed to be that existing low and im-oderate income
tenants, as well as owners, would benefit from rehabilitation.
Charlestown
Unlike Washington Park, Charlestown is a tightly-knit,
relatively homog-eneous "urban village," whose residents
are predoinantly blue collar, upwardly mobile, Irish
14
families. After a protracted and bitter struggle against
the BRA's original proposal to demolish a substantial
portion of the town, Charlestown residents were able to
make rehabilitation the focal point of the residential
renewal strategy. Final plans called for rehabilitation
of 89:o of the area's residential structures. - The under-
lying aim clearly was to stabilize the community for the
benefit of existing residents, and perhaps to bring back
some of the younger couples who had left Charlestown for
the suburbs during the previous decade . 16
The 'MT's assumption that "Charlestown has the h.ighost
potential for conservation and rehabilitation" stems from
22
a number of factors. Over 70%- of the structures in the area
are resident-owned, and most of the "absentee" landlords
are themis elves Charles t own res idents, owning only one or
18
two properties. DRA surveys of typical properties found
the cost of rehabilitation to be minimal--no nore than
$1700 for single family structures and $3050 for three-
family dwellings in poor condition (see Table II).
Additionally, the $6200 median family income of Charlestown
residents in 196019 s-uggested economic conditions favorable
for home improvement. Finally, the strong neighborhood
ties of most owners, the short Charlestown streets, and
the "kitchen culture" features of the area indicated that
rehabilitation, once "seeded," might easily be "transmitted
through the pores." 2 0
Based on the low rehabilitation cost estivmates ard
the assumied availability of liberal financing, the plan
predicted that monthly debt service would decrease for the
majority of property owners, remain about the same for
others, and in no case increase by more than $6 per dwelling
21
unit. But at the same time, the uniquely low rent-income
22
ratios of Charlestown residents--averaging 13( in 1960 --
suggested that tenants could absorb even greater rent
increases, should they be necessary. Finally, the strong
familial and social ties existing between many resident
owners and their tenants would seer to mitigate against
the likelihood of substantial dislocation resulting
from rehabilitatior, in the absence of strongir; econoic necessity.
23
South End
The South End has been described as an area of
architectural and historic unity, combined with extra-
ordinary social heterogeneity. 2 3 Blehind the elegant
brick facades of the five story row houses which characterize
the district physically, there is a vital social dynaric
revolving around at least four major interest groups:
the lodging hoise tenants, the lodging house proprietors,
the "urban villager" resident owners, and the affluent
white~ "urbanites .it
An estim,.ated 14,000--or nearly half--of the South End's
30,000 residents live in lodging houses., legally or illegally
operated. This sector of the population actually comprises
two major groups: the socially stable, elderly or retired
residents, and the "skid row" types, overburdened with
social and erotional problemIs. Both groups share a poverty-
level existence, giving the South End the dubious -distinction
cityV
of being the/district with the greatest proportion of house-
holds with incomes under 13000.25 While many of these
tenants have lived on the same street for twenty or thirty
years, their total lack of organization and power has placed
them at an obvious disadvantage in termis of the renewal
strategy.
Lodging house owners run the gamut from the classic
absentee slwmnlord to the low income elderly proprietress
for whom the building is both a home and the sole source
of economic security. As many as three qlaters of the
lodging houses are either resident-owned or owned by som.teone
26
living nearby in the South End. W1hile the true absentees
2)4
would sooner sell than invest even a few dollars for
property improvement, many resident or nearby-absentee
owners display a strong sense of comiitment to their
properties and neighborhoods, if not always to their
tenants Many would support a program of lodging house
rehabilitation which would ensure a reliable tenantry. 2 7
On the other hand, in the absence of a viable program
for lodging house retention which takes into account
the limited resources of the owners, the sales alternative
is undoubtedly more profitable for this group.
The middle aged and elderly blue collar residents
are the South End 's "urban villagers , " living in cohe-
sive ethnic or racial subcormuunities within the larger
district. This group includes many resident owners, who,
together with the lodging house owners, account for
248
the 50,- owner-occupancy ratio in South End buildings.
The "sense of neighborhood" shared by these owners and
their tenants provides a strong degree of commitm':ent to
the area.
Finally, the South End has recently become a haven
for white professional "urbanites," both owners and tenants,
attracted by the area's architectural charm and locational
advantages. This move. ent, which be-gan as a trickle prior
to the advent of renewal, has become a distinctly pronounced
trend in recent years. As a result of the urbanite influx,
the local housing market ha s been subjected to substantial
pressures which threaten to severely deplete the supply
of low and moderate incoho housing.
The fundamental issue of South End renewal has always
been whether the interests of the affluent newcomers can
be imade compatible with those of the "old, the poor, and
f29the problem-ridden."2 In terms of rehabilitation, which
is the proposed treatment for 75j, or 3000, of the area's
structures,30 the basic question is whether existing housing
units are to be retained for indigenous low and moderate
income residents, or converted for middle and upper income
occupancy in accordance with prevailing social and economic
forces.
The BRA has openly acknowledged that the South End
"probably represents the greatest challenge to the Authority's
'3]
rehabilitation effort." Yet the South End renewal nlan
strongly sL:eOsts that rehabilitation would be carried
out by and for existing low and moderate income rsidents.
As in the other areas, rehabilitation costs are assumed
to be minimal: no more than 1535 for sinl1e family an.cd
$1428 for three family structures in poor condition (see
Table II). Iith the availability of liberal financing,
post-rehabilitation increases in monthly carrying costs
are estimated at $7 or less with refinancing.- Finally,
the plan contains a pledge of assistance from local banks
to aid in the difficult task of financing lodging house
reliabilitati on.3 ,
26.
Administrative Context: BRA Procedures and Policies
The loan and grant progrant also operates within the
administrative context of Boston Redevelopment Authority
procedures and policies.
Procedures. Administration of the loan and grant
program is lodged within the DRA's Rehabilitation Section
and its three principal branches-rehabilitation, finance,
and legal. While major decisions are mrade by the central
rehabilitation office, considerable leeway is afforded
to s ite office rehalbilitation and finance staff who
administer the program from day to day. In general, loan
and grant adinistration conforms to the following nodel.35
Initial contact is established with the property
owner, either in connection with a property survey or at
the owner's initiative. If the owner expresses interest
in a grant or loan, a finance conference is held to
determine eligibility and debt service capacity (if appli-
cable). A preliminary work write-up, listing .iandatory
items and any optional work which the owner can afford,
is prepared along with cost estimates. Eventually, a
final work write-up and finance plan are developed.
The BRAfs next major function is to supervise the
selection of a contractor. If the work costs more than
$10,000, it is publicly advertised for competitive bidding
and the lowest bid from a responsible contractor is accepted
(unless the owner wishes to accept a high.er bid and pay the
difference). In the cost range of $500-810,0000, selected
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contractors are infornrally invited to bid on the work.
For work under $3500, the owner may negotiate an agreement
with the contractor, subject to the MA's approval, or
request competitive bidding.
Following contractor selection, in the case of a grant
the BRA simply issues its approval and work can proceed out
of renewal budget funds already at hand. For loan appli-
cants, a financial report must be prepared and approved
by the HUD Area Rehabilitation Loan Specialist, including
credit certification, lien status, owrnership verification,
and the like. Loan funds are then disbursed from the HUD
Regional Office.
Loan and grant funds for the work to be undertaken
are then deposited in an escrow account, to be released
Upon the contractor ts application for a progress payient.
This usually occurs at the 30/, 60, 90 and final
completion stages. While the work is contracted directly
between the owner and contractor, the BRA is in a position
to exercise considerable control over work quality. Property
inspections must occur at least prior to to every disbursal
of funds and, wherever possible, on a biweekly basis. While
funds can be released only with the owner's consent, the
BRA can advise owners as to the nature of contract compliance.
To insure an adequate amount of funds for work completion,
the BRA withholds 20! of the amount due at each payment stage.
When all work is satisfactorily completed, subject
to a final inspection and a release of liens by the contractor,
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the BRA issues the final payment. Work is guaranteed by
the contractor for one year. The BRA is also required to
conduct a post-completion inspection within 60 days after
the work is finished.
Policies. Within the framework prescribed by federal
laws and regulations, BRA policy on the important issues of
constituency and rehabilitatien level has, in the past,
been rather vague. With respect to constituency, the lack
of local policy for 312 loan eligibility has led. to a
first-come-first-served approach throughout much of the
program's history. Because the urban renewal projects
under consideration here were in operation prior to the 1968
legislative revisions on loan eligibility (see p. 9), this
de facto policy was allowed to prevail until late in 1969.
In Iovember, 1969, a new local regulation assigned
priority to loan applicants who were either low and
moderate income owner occupants, non profit sponsors,
or investors with commitments to lease at least one third
of their units to the Boston Housing Authority. 6  IQues-
tionable cases" must be referred by the site office to
the Chief of Rehabilitation for final determination, While
the new policy appears to signify an important shift on
the matter of loan constituency, the way in which it is
implemented at the site office and central office levels
is a critical matter for subsequent investigation.
On the issue of rehabilitation level, a Question and
Answer Bulletin distributed to notential loan and grant
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applicants states that "primarily the State Sanitary Codes
and the City of Boston Building Codes are the standards"
required for rehabilitation.37 On the other hand, the
BRA's general philosophy for rehabilitation is that
while "codes are designed to treat the illnesses of a
house,...our urban renewal program is concerned with
qualities of 'wellness."38 In fact, the urban renewal
plans suggest that compliance with plan objectives (see p. 11)
as well as PRS or code standards is mandatory:39
If...satisfactory conformance with the standards
and objectives...has not been achieved, the
Boston Redevelopment Authority may acquire the
property... /-italics mine_7
While this provision has not been enforced legally to
date, it does provide the BRA with considerable leeway to
"sell" a brand of rehabilitation considerably higher than
code level. In practice, this means an emphasis on replace-
ment and 'sprucing up," rather than on doingr the minimum
necessary for livability. The general philosophy has
been expressed by the Chief of Rehabilitation as follows:40
We want gutsy rehab. If we only went to
code standards we'd have to be back again in
six months...What we're really interested in is
selling a higher quality of rehab to the owners.
We try to convince them that this is what they
should do.
Given the generous amount of rehab permitted by federal
loan regulations, the extension of the "gutsy rehab" policy
to 312 borrowers would seem all but inevitable. The
extent to which this policy has influenced 312 rehabilitation
levels and costs is another important issue for subsequent
consideration.
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III Loan and Grant Rehabilitation Experience
WASIINIGTON PARK
Use of Loans and Grants
As of March, 1970, a total of 81 loans, 56 grants,
and 18 loan-and-grant "com.bos"l had been issued in Washington
Park (Table III). Loans and grants represent only about 15t
of all rehabilitation activity in the area (Table IV).
In this connection, it is im;,portant to note that
while loans and grants were available from the outset of
renewal in the other areas under consideration, they
arrived on the scene at the tail end of the Washington Park
project. Many owners who might have received loan or
grant assistance had already turned to less favorable forms
of financing or, in some cases, had been forced to sell
their hocms. 111t the fact that as many as 3/4 of those
who have rehabilitated have been able to use private, con-
ventional, or 220 financing attests to the relative afflience
of many ashington Park owners.
Since the bulk of Washington Park ts loan and grant
rehabilitation occurred in 1966 and 1967, much of the activity
in this area belongs to the realm of "past history." The
legislative revisions which substantially altered the
thrust of the program in mid-1968 are barely reflected in
the Washington Park eCperience. Nevertheloss, tie way in
which loans and grants were used in Washington Park should
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provide an important basis for comparison w'ith the present
program. It should be noted, however, that the time factor
did place somie limitations on data collection which make
the Washington Park information less comprehensive than
the data for other areas.
Population Served
According to site office staff, Washington Park grant
recipients are pri:tarily elderly or retired resident owners,
living in 2- and 3-family frame buildings. These sources
state that most grant recipients have very low incomes and
would have been forced out of the area had grant funds not
been made available.2
The 312 loan recipients are also predominantly 2- and
3-decker resident owners, tyjically blue collar employees
with working wives and families. Virtually all are black.
Although an exact breakdown is unavailable, only a handful
of investor owners are reported to have received 312 loans
in this area, including one limited-dividend corporation. 3
The extent to which the Washington Park loan constitu-
ency represents a group in need of special rehabilitation
subsidies is a matter open to some conjecture. On the one
hand, many of the loan recipients are said to be rejectees
from the FHA 220 program--which in 1967 was turning down
4
as many as 3/4 of its applicants. On the other hand, the
image of substantial need is not entirely co;sistent with
the average income of ;8356 and the :_edian of 9096 for
312 borrowers (see Table V). In fact, about one gua T r
of the loan recipients have incomes higher than 12,000,
while an equal number earn less than $6000. It should be
noted that under the new incom:e regulations, probably fewer
than half of the present loan recipients would qualify for
priority status (based on the standard of $9600 or less
for a family of 4).
Nevertheless, these aggregate statistics may mask
significant problems associated with credit stability or
property condition which would make many 312 borrowers
questionable risks in the eyes of a traditional lending
institution. In fact, this is often the case with regard
to dual-wage earner families, where the wife's income is
considered "unreliable." Secondly, the fact that these
owners had not yet rehabilitated:'by the time 312 loans
were available sugge-osts that they were cither bypassed
by other programs or for some reason reluctant to invest
the necessary funds. Thus the 312 program in Washington
Park seems to havc reached a constituency which may be
described as "bottoim of the barrel" in relation to the
rest of the area, in terms of capacity or desire to rehab.
On the other hand, rany owners who are clearly in need
of rehabilitation assistance have been unable to obtain
grants or loans for various reasons. Of primary importance
are the legislative and administrative barriers which existed
in the early years of the program. For instance,, prbvisions
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limiting grants only to those 1- and 2- family structures
which could be brought to code level for ,1500 or less
disqualified the many 3-decker owners, as well as those
whose properties required more than bare-minimum work.5
Loan applicants were often rejected for poor credit records
or outs tanding tax or water liens In addition, many who
had purchased property without proper legal protection
6
were disqualified on the basis of murky title records.
Finally, there were those who simply could not afford the
necessary work.
All of these problems were intensified because of the
strong role maintained by FHA in loan administration
during the height of Washington Park activity. As in
the 220 programa, the FIA's caution with respect to
borrower and property risks helped to exclude many applicants
from 312 loan as e istance. 7
To a degree, social factors have also excluded some
owners from rehabilitation assistance. 1specially in the
early years of the program, many elderly ownors refused
to believe that grants would not have to 1e repaid or
that liens would not be placed against their homes. On
the whole, though, the strong pro-renewal climate in
Washington Park probably created a more favorable attitude
towards loan and grant assistance than in either of the
other neijhborhoods under .cons iderat ion.
RhLabilitation Costs
Rehabilitation costs ider the 115 grant program
average $1909 per structure. Costs under the 312 program
average $5059 for single family structures, 85157 for 2-
family strotures, and $56S8 for three deckers (see Table VI).
Two significant observations can be made about the
312 cost figures. The first concerns the minimal cost
spread between the single family and 3-decker figures,
suggesting that relatively little additional interior work
is done outside the owner's apartment. Second, the actual
costs do not differ radically from original rehabilitation
estimates (Table II), given some allowance for cost infla-
tion. The slight differential, which narrows substantially
as structure size increases, might also reflect the cardinal
rehab principle that buildings ali:most always have more
defects than those revealed by initial surveys.
The relatively minimal cost figures sug-gest that 312
borrowers are in fact doing the kind of minimal level reha-
bilitation work contemplated in the original renewal plan.
Rehabilitation specialists familiar with the area tend to
agree that 312 k'ehabilitation generally entails only basic
structural and exterior work needed to correct code violations.
Based on their information and that provided in sample
project files, a typical 312 work write-up for a 3-decker
building would probably include the following items and costs:
porches - repair or replace (3) $2300
roof, gutters, chirmey repairs 500
electricity- rewire ? new service 1000





Some owners have also installed modern kitchen and bathroom
fixtures, but as a rule this is done only in the owner's
apartment, as the cost figures suggest.9
The relatively low level of rehabilitation achieved
with 312 financing in Washington Park may be attributed to
a number of factors. First, while building conditions
may have been worse than anticipated, the structures them-
selves are small, relatively new, and relatively easy to
J10
bring to code level without major replacement, Second,
as already noted, the kind of work which could be financed
under 312 early in the program was limited. Finally, the
tendency to do "just enough to get by" seems consistenit
with the image of 312 borrowers as a constituency with
relatively little capacity or enthusiasmn for rehabilitation.
More recent work write-ups do irdicate that some owners
are now undertaking a higher level of work, perhaps in
anticipation of attracting the more stable black middle
class tenantry now moving into the area, But generally,
it appears that in the absence of a prime constiteiency
for "gutsy rehabilitation," the BRA has been unable to
achieve the kind of high level work it typically advocates.
It is interesting to speculate as to the level and cost
of 312 rehabilitation that might have occurred, had loans
and grants been available earlier in the life of the
Washington Park project.
Rent Increases and Relocation
The econom.ics of loan and grant rehabilitation in
Washington Park would not seem to call for substantial
rent increases* Grant rehabilitation presumably entails
no cost increase to either owner or tenant. The average
312 rehabilitation cost of $2244 per unit (Table IV)
would yield an average rent increase of $12.50, based on
the standard 312 monthly debt service of $5.55 per '1000.
And since an estimated 105-30" of 312 borrowers in this
11
area have been able to refinance existing debt, rent
increase's could be considerably less or even non-
existent for some families. Similarly, the minimual
7
level of improvement undertaken by most 'owners would
not seem to call for tenant dislocation during rehab.
Data on actual rent levels in 312 buildings is
difficult to obtain, since the RA is not required to
maintain this information. Proposed rent schedules
are developed in conjunction with the financial report for
investors only, but the BRA cannot force owners to adhere
to these figures after rehabilitation. In any event,
investors constitute only a negligible proportion of Wash-
ington Park's 312 borrowers, as previously noted.
A reliable measure of tenant displacem-ent is also
difficult to obtain, since the official relocation figures
significantly understate the actual total. The. BRA will
relocate families from buildings under re'abilitation either
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when the extensive nature of the work makes continued
occupancy unfeasible, or when a ront . ine-rease of at least
10% is projected, and the tenant's post-rehab rent -incone
12
ratio would exceed 25,.12 But under the first condition,
the BRA must be able to verify that such work is underway
or financing for it committed; and many tenants undoubtedly
move before this point, especially if needed interim repairs
have been neglected. Under the second condition, the BRA
must be informed that excessive rent increases will occur
or have occurred. But since the BRA has no knowledge of
actual rents charged in 312 buildings, it stands to reason
that many tenants entitled to assistance might be bypassed
unless they happen to request help on their own.
Thus the BRA's assertion that "there has not been a
rent increase in excess of 10- under the 312 pro gram ,in
Washington Park" 1 -- which in turn is based on the absence
of any official relocation due to rent increases--is open
to some question. An independent effort to verify this
claim led to some;hat more ambivalent conclusions. This
was accompli.shed through short telephone interviews with
12 randomly selected 312 loan recipients, who were willing
to reveal rental information. 8 of the 12 stated that
they had- not increased rents more than 10(, as a result
of rehabilitation, while 4 stated that they had. Rents
charged by owners in the latter group ranged from $120
to $145 for 2-4 bedroom apartments.
Similarly, the 15 families who show up on ashington
Park relocation records as families displiaced by extensive
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312 rehabilitation do not necessarily reflect the total
amount of dislocation. In an attempt to gain a broader
view of dislocation, Boston- Police Census records of
residence and occupancy in 45 312 buildings were checked
for the years 1966 and 1969.. While the Census does not
accurately reflect turnover, since many families are
skipped each year, the occupational inforination viewed
in conjunction with apparent turnover gives some impression
of the extent to which rehabilitation has been accompanied
by a shift to higher status occupancy.
In 9 of the 45 buildings checked, both tenant turnover
and significant occupational shifts seemed evident. The
dominant occupational categories in these buildings prior
to rehab were "clerk," "at hom;e," and "hospital worker,"
as compared to "clergy," "social worker," "teacer," and
"student" after reliab. The other 36 building's eviden1 ced
either no turnover or turnover within the same general
kinds of occupations.
These findings certainly do not provide conclusive
evidence about the impact of 312 rehabilitation on rent
levels or dislocation. Nevertheless, they do suggest
that while the economics of 312 rehab have not imposed significant
costs on tenants, on the whole, a minority probably have
been displaced by rent increases beyond their means. The
social conflicts between Washington Park ownersand tenants
and tihe high pre-rehab rent incol::e ratios noted earlier
can e cited as faictors wh'Lich probably acco.unt for this
-lswis
tendency.
Future market trends , especially with regard to the
middle income tenantry moving into the area, will determine
whether the cost of 312 rehabilitation to indigenous low
and moderate income tenants will be substantially greater
in the long run. But given the minimal amount of rehab
achieved with 312 financing, it is probably safe to pre-
dict a relatively limited demand for these units by higher
income groups in the near future.
Finally, it should be noted that the minimal use
of leased housing in Washington Park 312 buildings to
date has hardly helped to counteract whatever shift
towards higher income occupancy might be occurring.
Boston Housing Authority leased housing records snhow
13 leased units in the Washiingtorr Park 312 program, all
in investor-owned buildings. Presumably, this total may
increase in the remaining months of the project under the
new loan priorities; one such loan for an investor is
now being processed.
CHARLEOSTOWN
Use of Loans and Grants
As of April, 1970, 72 grants, 97 312 loans, and 20
loan-and-grant "comnbos" had been issued in Charlestown
(Table III). Loans and grants represent about one third
of the total rehabilitatioxi volume in thiis area--roughly
double the Washington Park ratio. (Table IV)
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In contrast, about 60 of the -Charlestown owners who
have rehabilitated to date have used private funds, re-
flecting the accessibility of many owners to "mattress
money." Much of the work falling into this category is
actually done informally by friends and relatives with
construction skills, which seem almost second nature to
many Charlestown residents. Only a small fraction of
owners in this area have used conventional or 220 loans
for rehabilitation.
After a slow beginning in 1966 and 1967, the pace of
loan and grant activity in Charlestown built up in 1968,
only to slow down in 1969 because of the national funding
problem noted earlier. With property surveys in the area
now about 60 completed, the Charlestown R1ehabilitation
Chief projects a need for 142 additional loans and 61
more grants by 1972.15
Pop~ulation Served
As in Washington Park, Charlestown grant recipients
are predominantly elderly or retired resident owners with
very low incoes. About one quarter of the grant recipients
have incomes higher than $3000, qualifying on the basis
of excessive ronthly housing costs. But only in two instances
do the incomes of these owners exceed $6000 (see table V).
While the Charlestown 312 program contains the highest
proportion of single family residences, more than half of
the rehabilitated structures are 2- and 3-family buildings.
About 80% are owner occupied (see Table VI). The owner
occupant borrowers conform to the Profile of typical
Charlestown residents: many are longshoremen or city
employees with large families and strong roots in Charlestown.
In terms of age, the 312 recipients are on the young side
for the area: an estimated three quarters of the group
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are under 45, and more and miore are in their twenties.
The average income of owner occupant loan recipients
in Charlestown is $8076 and the median is t;8260. Almost
one quarter have incoiies higher than :'12,000, with an
equal nwber earning less than $6000 (see table v),
On the surface, these figures would seem to indicate a
similarity in economic status between the Charlestown and
Washington Park borrowers. However, the significant differences
in terms of race, age, and family charactoristics--including
the fact that the family income in Charlestown usually
derives from only one wage earner--suggest a substan-
tially greater degree of financial security in the Charlestown
situation.
An important characteristic of 312 loan recipients
in Charlestown is that of relatively low or non-existent
debt encumbrance prior to rehab. Many Charlestown owners
inherit property from relatives or frieids at little or no
cost. And until recently, those who purchased property on
the market were able to benefit from depressed sales prices
17and correspondingly low mortgages.
One consequence of this rather unique debt situation,
in conjunction with the feature of moderate-to-middle level
incomes, is that fewer than 2- of Charlestown's loan recipients
18
have been able to refinance existing debt. For example,
in a typical $10,000 rehabilitation situation, with debt
service on the 312 loan amounting to 855 per month., debt
service on the existing mortgage might be no more than $35.
With a total monthly debt service of $90, an owner could
earn no more than §450 per month, or $4800 per year, to
be eligible for refinancing (see p. 13). As noted above,
the incomes of most 312 borrowers in Charlestown are in a
considerably higher range.
Charlestown's 312 program also includes a number of
investor-owners, who have rehabilitated about 1/5 of the
312 buildings (table VI). The investor group includes
a number of professiolal contractors, who have thom:selves
handled a considerable amount of 312 rehabilitation work
in the area. The affluence of these few operators accounts
for the gross disparity between average and median income
figures for investors (table V). The non profit Charlestown
Development Corporation has also rehabilitated 5 properties
under the 312 program.
W1hether the present 312 loan recipients are those most
in need of rehabilitation subsidies and assistance is, again,
a matter open to debate. In the opinion of the.project rehab
chief, most of the homes in Charlestown would have been
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demolished or sold in the absence of the loan and grant
program. On the other hand, it is worth noting that under
the new loan regulations, possibly one third of the present
resident-owner loan recipients would not qualify for
priority status because their incoimies exceed the $lL,050
maximum for families with 5-6 persons. Many of the
present recipients might have been able to afford a minimal
level of rehabilitation with their own funds, and most
of the investors night have financed rehalilitation con-
ventionally, were it not for the present tight money
situation. At any rate, it seems clear that the Charlestown
loan recipients do not resemble the "bypassed" constituency
receiving 312 assistance in Iashington Park.
On the other hand, some owners wlo may be equally, if
not more, in need of assistance have been excluded from
the benefits of the loan and grant program. These include
some owners who could not afford to bring their properties
into code compliance with a grant, but who did not .qualify
for loans because of low incomes or poor credit ratings.
Since HUD has recently begun to allow the use of co-sigiers,
19the size of this group has probably decreased.' Secondly,
there are owners who cannot accept the idea of assuming
debt after years of debt-free or low-debt ownership,
particularly when the cost ofrehabilitation equals or
exceeds the original purchase price of the house. Even
outright grants have been rejected for simnilar reasons.
In the world-view of the typical Charlestown owner, which is
laden with a good deal of suspicion for the outside world,
it simply does not make sense to spend $3000 on a wiring
job when the house was purchased 10 years ago for $2000.20
Coupled with this negativism is a general resentment
toward the URA, the legacy of stormy renewal battles which
have apparently left deep wounds. According to the Charles-
town rehab staff, at least half the owners will not even
allow the ERA to survey their homes, one of the pre-requisites
21
of rehabilitation assistance. Finally, some owners are
reluctant to invest money in their properties "mtil the
el coimies down" or the BRA offers other tangible evidence
of commitment to the "New Charlestown.*1"
Rehabilitation Costs
The cost of rehabilitation financed with grants in
Charlestown averages "?3112--reflecting the tendency of
many grant recipients to supplement the grant with private
funds. Rehabilitation costs under the 312 program average
$7203 for single family structures, $12,715 for 2-family
structures, and $22,325 for 3-family buildings (see table VI).
Costs for investor-owned buildings are double those of
resident owned buildings, probably reflecting the fact that
many iivestors are rehabilitating vacant or badly deteriorated
structures.
Not only are Charlestown 312 costs considerably higher
than Washington Park costs under the same prograu, but they
also bear little resemblance to. the cost estimates in the
urban renewal plan. The disparity may be attributed to
several factors, in addition to cost inflation and the
typical "ballpark" nature of rehabilitation cost estimate
figures.
First, many Charlestown structures apparently require
substantial work to meet code standards. Typical code
violations include inadequate electrical service, improperly
vented space heaters, rotted wooden cellar posts, and
dirt basements insufficiently impervious to moisture. 2 3
But more important than the nature of the violations is
the manner in which most 312 recipients have chosen to
correct them. While the typical Washington Park borrower
would probably remedy the heating problem with a new pump
for $50, the Charlestown owner would install central heating,
for $1000. Moreover, he would provide a modern bathroom
and kitchen in each apartment, even where existiang fixtures
were basically sound though deficient by current standards
of convenience and status. Thus, Charlestown rehabilitation
specialists estimxate that the following work items and costs
are typical in a wood frame, 3- family house:
rewiring and new electric service $2000
basement floor- concretize 350




exterior- new siding or painting 1000
new kitchen, including panelling (3) 7500
new 3 piece bath (3) 1500
TOTAL $18450
In addition, about half the owners replace existing roofs.
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Somle measure of the externt to which 312 loan money
in Charlestown is being allocated for non-essential reha-
bilitation--i.e. rehabilitation beyond code level-- is
provided in Table VII. The table shows cost breakdowns
from 25 random-ily selected work write-ups, and the percentage
of the total cost represented by non-essential items
(urban renewal objectives and general property improvements)
in each case. Among the items most frequently listed in
these categories are kitchen and bathroom fixtures, panelling,
ceramic wall and floor tile, base and wall cabinets, garbage
disposals, and landscaping. On the whole , an average of
27. of the total rehabilitation expenditure represented by
these properties is allocated to non-essential items. More-
over, since the same or similar items may be categorized
as incipient code violations--given the general tendency
of rehab specialists to maximize the cost base upon which the
24general property imrovement allowance is calculated--this
measure of above-code level rehab may be considered a
conservative one.
Finally, it is of interest that per unit rehabilitation
costs under the 312 program are more than twice as high as
per unit costs under other types of rehab financing in the
area (table IV). While this surprising cost disparity may
indicate a relatively greater degree of deterioration
in 312 buildings, it also suggests that 312 borrowers may
be achieving a higher level of rehabilitation than owners
using private, conventional, or FIA funds.
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Clearly in Charles town, the middle class aspirations,
relative financ 1 security, and long term neighborhood
commitment of 312 borrowers is a majOr factor influencing
the level of rehabilitation. In this case, the liberalized
312 regulations, permitting a wide range of improvements
and conveniences, and the BRAts "gutsy rehab" policy have
found a ready-made constituency.
The level of rehabilitation undertaken with 312 money
in Charlestown may well be economically justifiable in
the long run for most of the 312 borrowers--although
the BRA itself is aware of some instances in which the
large sums invested undoubtedly will never be recouped. 2 5
And obviously the distinction between "essential" and "non-
essential" rehabilitation is difficult to draw in many
cases. The point is simply that higher level rehab neces-
sarily entails higher costs whichi may have a substantial
iripact on other groups-mriost immediately, on tenants, through
rent hi-kes, an.d in the long run, on less affluent owners,
through substantially increased tax assessm-ents which they
may not be able to afford.
Rent Increases and Rehabilitation
Based on the average per unit rehabilitation cost of
$6570 (table iv) and the standard 312 monthly debt service
of $5.55 per 01:000, the economics of 312 rehabilitation in
Charlestown would predict rent increases averaging 36.50
per month. Despite the uniquely low rent-income ratios of
Charlestown's tenants, noted earlier, rent increases of this
magnitude could obviously impose substantial costs on low
and moderate income occupants.
Since the Charlestown site office has maintained some
information on proposed rents in both resident- and investor-
owned buildings, it was possible to subject this presumption
to some empirical verification (see Table VIII). In the
19 owner occupied buildings for which proposed rents
were recorded, gross rentals averaged .86 before rehabili-
tation and 122 after. This reflects an increase of exactly
$36. In the 11 investor-owned buildings, pre-rehab rents
averaged $78, as compared to post-rehab rents of $130.
The increase reflected in this case is $52, consistent
with the higher rehabilitation costs in investor-owned
buildings noted earlier.
While there is no available data on actual rents
charged, sources familiar with the Charlestown -arket
indicate that prevailing rents for relabilitated buildings
allow investors to charge slightly more than the average
figure suggests.2 Boston Housing Authority estimiates of
economic rents in the Charlestown rehabilitation market--
used as a basis for calculating leased housing subsidies--
range from -145 to $160 for 1 to 3 bedroom apartments.
It should be noted that thus far, only 20 units in 8
investor-owned buildings have been leased to the Boston
Housing Authority.2 7 For the most part, 312 rehabilitation
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by investors seems to be aimed at a younger, more affluent
market--perhaps at the trickle of young Boston professionals
who are beginniing to discover the advantages of Charlestown's
28prime location.
On the other hand, it is widely believed that many
resident owners charge even less than rehabilitation costs
might justify, in the interest of retaining long term
tenants with whoim they have strong social or familial
ties, In fact, the Charlestown site office finance specialist
indicates that he has often overstated proz osed rents
"for the record," in order to ensture HUD approval.2 9
Available data on tenant displacement also suggests
a more optimistic picture than the econoimics of rehabilita-
tion might predict. Official records list only five families
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who have been relocated from 312 buildings--although this
infor-.ation must be interpreted subject to the numerous
caveats noted earlier. An analysis of occupancy data
in the Boston Police Census for 1966 and 1969 reveals only
12 out of 83 312 buildings in which the nature of tenant
turnover seen.s significant. These include 6 instances
of turnover accompanied by an occupational shift suggesting
higher status tonantry--e.g. from "laborer" and "clerk" to
"student," "teacher," and "attorney." In 6 other instances,
buildings fully occupied in 1966 were totally vacant in
1969, suggesting a possible association between rehabilita-
tion and displacement. Of interest, too, is the fact
that 8 of the 12 buildings in question were inve.s tor-owned,
i.ncluding several on Bunker Hill and Monument Square, two
relatively prestigious neighborhoods.
These findings suggest that the unique owner-tenant
relationships in Charlestown m-ay well have mitigated the
consequences of 312 rehabilitation for tenants in resident-
owned buildings. Tenants in investor-owned buildings have
probably not fared as well. It should be noted, though,
that the force of this "social exeription" is hardly
guaranteed for future generations of low and moderate income
tenants. There is already some indication that natural
turnover in resident-owned buildings may be accompanied
by substantial rent increases. 3 Given the level of
modernization being achieved by 312 loan recipients in
both resident- and investor-owned buildings, the future
of the area's housing resources for low and rioderate incom;e
families is open to question. Whether a stepped-up leased
housing program1 can recapture somte of thcse resources- for
continued occupancy by these groups remxains to be seen.
SOUTH END
Use of Loans and Grants
As of April, 1970, a total of 54 grants, 119 loans,
and 13 loan-and-grant coibinations had been issued in the
South End, representing about 37- of all rehabilitation
activity in the area (tables III & IV). Loans and grants
thus play a larger role in the South End than in either of
the other two rehabilitation neighborhoods. At the same
tine, conventional loans account for more than 4o of the
rehabilitation activity in the South Lnd, in sharp contrast
I
to their limited role in other areas. The affluence of
the district 's "urbanite" owners undoubtedly accounts
for this unique feature of its loan distribution.
Virtually all of the South End's loan and grant
rehabilitation has occurred during the past two years.
Projected needs are for another 319 grants and 2000
loans or loan and grant "coimbos" by 1975, the target
date for project completion.3 2
Population Served
As in- the other two areas, South End grant recipients
are predominantly elderly or retired resident owners with
incomes under $3000. About a fifth have incomes between
$3000 and $6000 (table V).
About 2/3 of the loan recipients are resident owners,
with incomes averaging nearly 12,000 (table V). The
figure suggests that most are the relatively affluent
white urbanites who have recently moved to the South E/nd,
About one fifth of the loan recipients have incomes below
$6000, and ight be catcgorized as more -typical indigenous
owners. Many of these live in ethnically or racially
cohesive neighborhoods and received their loans very early
in the program. One sdch neighborhood with a heavy con-
centration of 312 loan (and grant) money is Greenwich-
Sussex, whichis often displayed by the BRA as a "showcase"
of indigenous owner rehabilitation. However, it is hardly
representativc of the way in wIlich the progra, is being used
today.
AInvestor-owners, who have -received about 1/3 of the
South End 312 loans to date, seem to be the prime candidates
for 312 rehabilitation at present. This group includes
a few seasoned operators, who have already made their
reputations as South End landlords, some professional
rehabilitation contractors, and three non profit or limited
dividend coriorations. The average income of investors
is over -30,000 (table V).
In all, slightly miore than 1/3 of the loans have
gone to owners of single family hom:-es, and the rest to
owners of 2-9 unit buildings. The average incole of all
312 borrowers in the South End is about 16,600.
Apart from the minority of indigenous owners, the
312 loan constituency in the South End is clearly a select
group, ii relatively little need of rehabilitation subsidies.
The inability of the 312 loan program to extend the benefits
of rehabilitation to those in greatest need of assistance
is also most evident here. The problem of rehab exclusion
due to economic factors is critical: few low or moderate
income owners can comprehend, let alone afford, a $20,000-
$30,000 rehabilitation job on a house they have lived in
for years (see below). TNot infrequently, the required
rehabilitation investment may approach or exceed the cost
of buying a new suburban hoime. M.oreover, high rehabilitation
costs m..ay threaten traditional ways of living which owners
are reluctant to Qhane--e.g. by requiring a single family
resident owner to rent out apartments to make ends meet.
The group most system:;atically excluded fro;, 312 reha-
bilitation. assistance are the resident or "nearby absentee"
lodging house owners. Rehabilitation costs for these owners
are especially prohibitive, because of the substantial
amount of internal restructuring required to bring the
buildings into code compliance. This is the case whether
the building is to be retained for lodging house occupancy
or converted to apartments, since most South End lodging
houses occupy a limbo status between the two categories. 3 3
Administrative regulations further complicate atters, since
a lodging house lacking at least one oomplete apartment
is considered a "coiinercialI structure, . Funds for 312
commercial rehabilitation, non-existent before 1969,
are still in short supply and difficult to obtain. Moreover,
a house with an apartmernt is designated a "mixed use" for
312 purposes, requiring the coordination of three separate
work write-ups, bids, and processing channels for loan
approval. Not surprisingly, only one such loan has been
successfully negotiated to date. Finally, since lodging
houses by definition contain more than 4 residential units,
even resident lodging house pr6prietors are ineligible
for grants, although many could benefit from this added
assistance.34
The ways in which BRA policy has operated to reinforce
the selection of loan recipients dictated by economic and
social forces is readily apparent in the South E nd. in
addition to the past practice of first come, first served
rehabilitation assistance--which clearly gave the edge to
the more ambitious and financially capable urbanites--
the BRA made a practice of servicing new would-be resident
owners on the more favorable loan terms available to owner
occupants, even before they moved into their properties.
There are also unconfirmed allegations that some otrners
were receiving 312 loan assistance even before acquiring
title to their properties. Finally, the underlying bias
which these practices seeied to reflect convinced many
indigenous South End owners that 312 loans were only for
"people with money." This belief, in turn, reinforced
their own lack of rehab enthusiasm and their reluctance
to approach the BRA for assistance.36
Whether the new priorities for 312 loan applicants
will substantially alter the pattern of future loan
distribution remains to be seen. The site office staff's
37present emphasis on the "flexibility" of these regulations
suggests that strict enforcement is not contemplated for
the immediate future. More important, however, is the issue
of whether rehabilitation by indigenous owners is even
feasible with existing financing tools, given the nature
of rehabilitation required by South End buildings (see below).
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Rehabilitation Costs
The cost of grant rehabilitatio-n in the South End
averages $2771. 312 loan rehabilitation costs average
$8318, $17,967, $27,364, and $32,904 for 1-, 2-, 3-, and
4-family buildings, respectively (see Table VI). As in
Charlestown, costs are consistently higher in investor-
owned buildings, many of which were burnt-out shells
prior to rehabilitation.
Actual 312 rehabilitation costs clearly bear no resem-
blance to the initial South End r ehabilitation cost estimates.
They are also substantially higher than 312 costs in either
of the other two areas under consideration. This suggests
that a totally different kind of rehabilitation is now
occurring in these buildings, which more closely resembles
total roconstruction or extensive remodeling than minival
or intermlediate level rehabilitation.
Several factors have constributed toward the high level
of rehabilitation being accomplished with 312 financing.
First, according to many rehabilitation specialists, the
degree of deterioration and obsolescence found in many
of the 80-100 year old South End buildings calls for replace-
ment fiather tIlan repair. To bring a typical 3 story brick
row house up to minimal standards of livability usually
requires replacement of all major systems, e.g. electric,
plumbing, and heating, as well as new windows and a new roof.
Thus a minimum rehab job in such a structure would probably
entail the following items and costs:






TOTAL (basic items) J_14000
However, Boston building code requirements often raise
the cost of basic rehabilitation in the South End. If
rehabilitation costs amount to $50/por more of the total
value, or-if a legal "change of occupancy" is required,
the owner must make the pre-code building comply with a
number of post-code building requirements that would not
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otherwise be applicable. For instance, an owner might
waxit to renovate four existing apartments in a house last
registered as a single family dwelling. Although the practical
usage of the bilding has deviated from the le;ally registered
us0 for years, such work would be classified as a change of
occupancy. And because of this technicality, the owner
might be forced to replace existing plaster ceilings in
relatively good condition, because they are insufficiently
fire resistive by present code standards. 3 9
Secondly, South End rehabilitation costs reflect the
process of market trarsition facilitated by the dispensation
of 312 money to urbanite borrowers. M1any of the more affluent
loan recipients are using 312 money to convert old lodging
houses for higher income occupancy, a particularly costly
process. Even when the most economic approach--that of
restoration to the building's original single family usage
-- is adopted, the cost of interior de;olition is substantial.
And if the house is converted into apartments, there is the
added cost of restructuring, installing partitions, new
bathrooms, kitchens, etc.4 0
Moreover, in the process of reconstruction iany owners
seerti to be achieving a level of iodernization approaching
"luxury" rehabilitation. South End work write-ups show
that in addition to modern kitchen and bathroom fixtures,
ceramic tile, and wvall panelling, South End 312 borrowers
often go in for dishwashers, clothes washers and dryers, wall-to-wall
carpeting, electric heat, extra closets, and new oak flooring.
Since these items seei to show up in the work write-ups
as corrections of actual or incipient code violations just
as often as they are categorized under urban renewal objec-
tives or general property improverents, the cost breakdown
in Table VII provides a gross under-estirxate of the extent
of above-code level rehabilitation. It should be noted that
while this confusion of categories in part reflects the sub-
stantial deterioration of South End buildings--so that almost
anything can be justified as a "necessary" expenditure-- it
also suggests the rehab specialists' bias toward "gutsy
rehabilitation" which many are free to adnit. One specialist
even indicated that he might classify a garbage disposal
as.a-necessary expense, considering its function in correcting
littering problems.
58
In other ways, too, BRA practices have worked to encourage
the high rehabilitation level desired by affluent South End
borrowers--which surely pushes the limits of permissable
312 rehabilitation. For exam-ple, lodging house conversion,
until recently, was not discouraged; in fact, the availability
of free design service from the DRA may have facilitated
the conversion process in many inistances. 4  (Recently, HUD
has insisted that applicants for conversion work obtain
change of occupancy permits and finance the associated pre-
liminary costs on their own, before applying for 312 loan
assistance. )
As in Charlestown, it may be that 312 subsidies are
enabling South End borrowers to achieve an even higher level
of rehabilitation than owners using conventional, private,
or 220 financing. As Table IV indicates, per unit costs
for 312 rehabilitation are higher than the per unit costs
for these financing programs, but the differential is not
as significant as that found in Charlestown. Once again,
the differences in building condition between structures
undergoing 312 as opposed to other kinds of rehabilitation
may be an important factor to consider in this connection.
Rent Increases and Relocation
Based on the average per unit rehabilitation cost of
$85117 (table TV), the economics of 312 rehabilitation alone
in the South End would call for monthly rent increases as
high as 047.50 per unit. Since only a fraction of 312 loan
recipients have been able to ref inance existing debt--
because of high incomles aid the inapplicability of refinancing
provisions to investor-owners-- there is little chance of
reduced monthly costs on this account. Increases of
this magnitude would obviously impose substantial costs
on indigenous low and moderate income South End tenants.
MUoreover, in view of the kind of rehabilitation being
financed with 312 funds, emphasizing conversion, a sub-
stantial degree of dislocation appears all but inevitable.
Some confirmation of this presumption is provided by
an analysis of proposed rents in 11 312 buildings, containing
some 48 dwelling units, for which the South End site office
has recorded such information (see table ViII). All of
the buildings are investor owned. While the absence of
comparable information for res id ent-owned st-uctures is
unfortunate, it should be noted that investor-owned buildings
accounted for m13ost of the rental units p;rovided by 312
rehabilitation in the South End. Moreover, since most of
the resident owners providing rental units are also affluent
urbanites undertaking essentially the same kind of rehabili-
tation as the investors--although at somewhat lower cost--
rent levels in both kinds of buildings are likely to be similar.
According to the analysis, proposed gross monthly rents
after rehabilitation average $160. Moreover, in 2 of the
11 buildings, containing a total of 7 units, actual rents
are known to be $25-8 30 higher than the proposed levels.
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That prevailing rents for rehabilitated units are indeed
well up into this range is indicated by the Boston Housing
Authority s maximum leased housing rents for the area, which
are $130, $160, and 1 180 for 1-3 BR apartments. It should
be noted that so far, only 30 units have been leased to
the BTA in conjunction with 312 rehabilitation, all in non-
profit or limited-dividend soonsored buildings. A few
owners are reportedly in the process o' negotiating commit-
ments in line with the new loan priorities, but some
have apparently dem-anded higher rents than what the EiHA
is willing to pay.
Available information also supports the prediction
that 312 rehabilitation is causing considerable dislocation.
Official records show only 17 families in 8 312 buildings
who have 0een relocated due to extensive rehabilitation,
but the general feeling amiong relocation staff is that
this number is conservative for reasons already noted. 4 5
On the other hand, Boston Police Census data for 312
buildings rehabilitated between 1966 and 1969 present
an entirely different picture. Of the 64 buildings for
which occupancy records were analyzed, 26 evidenced the
kind of occupancy shift which might be associated with
rehabilitation for higher income levels. Tn 14 of the
26 buildings, tenant turnover was acconpanied by a sig-
nificant shift in occupational status; the dominant occu-
pational listings for these buildings clanged from
"retired," "C.t home, " "factory worker," and "clerk" prior
to rehab, to "secretary," "student," "teacher," and "attor-
ney" after rehab, Judging from recorded birth-years, many
of the pre-rehab residents of these buildings seered to
be elderly, suggesting that the buildings were probably
lodging houses. In the other 12 instances, buildings
fully occupied in 1966 were totally vacant in 1969. 9
of' these also ap-peared to be lodging houses with multiple
occupancy by elderly and retired persons. Of interest, too,
is the fact that 14 of the 26 buildings evidencing "significant"
displacem-.ent have been rehabilitated by resident owners,
according to IBRA records. This provides soLe support for
the previous suggestion that both resident- and investor
owners are rehabilitating for higher status or higher income
occupancy.
These findings obviously do not offer proof of a
direct relationship between displacement and rehab ili-
tation in every case. It is possible that some buildings
became vacant with increased deterioration and were then
sold to owners desiring to rehabilitate with 312 funds.
But by the same token, the deterioration process may have
been hastened by the previous owner's awareness of a ready
resale and rehabilitation iarket, due in part to the
availability of 312 funds for urbanite rehabilitation.
In any case, the impression yielded by both available
rental aid displacement information is that 312 subsidies
are facilitating, if not reinforcing, rnarket trends which
ipoT)se substantial economic anid social. costs on indigenous
South E'nd tenants. That South End tenant groups are fully
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aware of this trend is evident from the recent "squatting"
action which occurred in a 312 building on Yarrmouth Street.
IV The Quality of Rehabilitation Assistance Provided
For those owners who have received rehabilitation
bans or grants, the quality of rehabilitation assistance
provided is an important consideration in measuring the
program's impact. In particular, to what extent have loan
and grant recipients actually benefitted from the added
component of direct government involve,]ent in various
phases of the rehabilitation process--i.e., application
processing, work write-ups, and quality and cost control?
A further question concerns the way in which the benefits
of these services have been distributed among various
recipient groups.
Since the m:ost significant contrasts in relation to
these issues have occurred within, rather than between, the
rehabilitation neighborhoods, the frameworlk of examination
here will be a general one with areal differences noted as
appropriate. The inform~ation upon which this analysis is
based is largely impressionistic, gained through interviews
with loan and grant recipients, other area residents, and
ERA staff.
Application Processing
A major problem associated with the quality of assistance
provided to loan recipients., more so than grant recipients,
is the amount of time required to serv-ice and process a
request for rehabilitation aid. Uxder the most favorable
circumstances, the time elapsing between the initial
property survey and the "proceed to work" order is about
three months. This minimum schedule assumes about six
weeks in the "rehab stage," (property survey, preliminary
and final work write-up, bid advertisements, and biddirg),
followed by two weeks in "finance" (credit and municipal
lien review, title search, preparation of mortgage documents)
and one month for IIUD approval.
While this timetable has been considerably abridged
over the life of the progran, it-still compares unfavorably
with the usual processing schedule for a conventional bank
2loan. Mloreover, a variety of delaying factors may arise
at any stage, so that the typical processing schedule is
actually closer to 6 months than 3 months.
In the rehab stage, for ins tan ce, the need to re-write
work write-ups and/or re-bid work is common. Work write-
ups may have to be re-written for a number of reasons, e.g.,
the owner may change his mind, the Building Department's
ruling on work required for a change of occupancy may differ
from the rehab specialist's assumptions, or the BRA may
over-estimate the owner's financial capacity. The-latter
problem, which was critical in the early years of the program
when there was little coordination between the rehab and
finance functions, has been alleviated considerably in recent
years. The need to re-bid work usually arises when the
initial rotnd of bids are substantially out of line with
the specialist's estilate. Additionally, the ERA often
blames owners who are slow to respond to initial offers
of rehabilitation assistance for delays at this stage--
but such problems may well result from insufficient
follow-through by the rehab specialist.
At the finance stage, many of the factors which
operate to disqualify some lower income applicants from
getting loans work to delay the applications of others.
Poor title records and outstanding municipal liens are
the primary problems in this regard. Secondly, credit
reference checks can be time consuilng, particularly
if the owner does not readily reveal information. For
an applicant with a dubious credit rating, a co-signer's
references iust in turn be checked. Finally, iD's
past insistence on updating credit liform ation after
three months often prolonged the application process even
more, but this problem has been somewhat abated by the
recent extension of this limitation to six months. It
Problems in the HUD-approval stage relate primarily
to red tape and backlogs, and to the need for checking and
rechecking information with the local agency. Additionally,
Boston's Area Rehabilitation Loan Specialist has a reputa-
tion for exacting review; thus applications are often
returned to the site office for i-dotting and t-crossing,
figurativOly speaking.
Obviously, for "problei' cases" -- eg. poor credit risks
or owners uidertaking complex rehabilitation work--the
processing timetable may well be longer than 6 months.
And at the end of the processing period, the availability
of loan funds is never guaranteed, as some owners discovered
in the Spring of 1969 (see p. 14).
Work Write-Ups
A second iajor problem. area concerns the quality of
technical assistance provided by the ThRA in developing
work write-ups and cost estimates,
Difficulties in this regard seem to arise most often
in connec-tion with owners who want to do less rehabilitation
work than the BRA deems advisable . While the BRA often
attributes such conflicts to the owner's failure to compre-
hend tlhe need to meet basic Lealth and safety requirements,
owners frequently accuse the BRA of trying to imose alien
middle class standards and costs on their more modest style
of living.
There is undoubtedly some truth on either side of this
issue, with the balance varying in each individual situation.
For instance, while the requiremtent for concretizing basement
floors might seem superfluous--understandably--to Charles-
town owners who never use their basements, this work is
probably essential for rat-proofing protection. But on the
other hand, there have been situations in which the rehab
spocialist's "suburban"I housing standards have led to a
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judgment that a particular work item iis necessary which is,
to say the least, questionable.6 This may have been the
case, for exar.ple, with regard to a particular South End
ownter who was forced to spend most of her grant m.oney on
rewiring only to be told later by another specialist that
7
the job had been unnecessary. Mforeover, the BRA's general
emphasis on high-level rehabilitation reinforces the likeli-
hood of such conflicts--particularly if specialists believe,
as some have in the past, that their performance is being
rated according to the dollar value of rehabilitation they
are able to sell.8
Finally, some critics attribute these problems as much
to the inefficiency and incomi-petence of particular reiab
specialists as to value conflicts between the B1RA and lower
or working class homeowners . While the official rolabilita-
tion specialist job qualifications include a "thorough
knowledge of the materials, iethods, and techniques used
in building construction," as well as "the ability to
establish and maintain effective working relationships with
property owners and the general public," it is widely
alleged that the primary job requisite in practice is
"knowing someone." While competence may not be a major
problem in this regard, it cannot be totally discounted
in a system which relies so heavily on the skills and
discretion of -particular individuals.
Oualitv and Cost Control
The most comon sources of dissatisfaction on the part
of loan and grant recipients relate to the quality of rehabili-
tation work done and the prices charged to pay for it.
Charges that contractors fail to kmet work write-up
specifications, display poor workl;anship, or simply walk off
the job before completion are widespread in all three areas.
One rehabilitation specialist in Charlestown estimated that
about half the owners had complaints of this nature.
The feeling that prices are out of line, especially relative
to work perforlance, also appears to be prevalent.
Complaints about work quality and cost have been common
to all kinds of rehabilitation in the past, as noted earlier
(see p. 5). The issue here is whether and to what extent
the added feature of public intervention in the rehabilita-
tion process has operated to reinforce or mitigate the
impact of these problel>s on owners u rehabilitation.
With regard to usatisfactory rehabilitation work, the
basic sources of the problem: apiear to lie outside the loan
and grant program per se. As noted earlier, reliable mad
skilled general rehabilitation contractors are scarce, and
even good contractors operating on a shoestring easily
becon:e over-extended due to the unpredictability of rehabilitation
work, Moreover, with construction costs now escalating at
, 10
the rate of 1c per month, the incentive to cut corners
or substitute cheaper items is strong even for contractors
whose primary objective is not strict profit maximization.
Under the circumstances, unsophisticated owners are easily
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put at a disadvantage.
On the other hand, certain aspects of the loan and
grant program may work to reinforce these problems. The
unpredictable timiespan between bidding date and job
start on a 312 loan narrows the field of interested bidders
and enhances the likelihood of corner-cut.ting due to
over-extension. 1 1  And even where applications are pro-
cessed smoothly, bureaucratic delays in meeting progress
payment. requests may have the same effect.12 Additionally,
the ambiguous work write-ups prepared by some rehab specialists
may provide opportunities for the use of inferior materials.
On occassion, too. specialists overlook items, such as
closet doors, which must later be paid for out of conltin-
gency funds or t:he owner 's pock1,et.
Most important, though, is the failure of the ER A to
act more forcefully to ensure the adequacy of rehab work.
Technically, the MRA considers itself a neutral adm.inistrator,
whose role is to conciliate owner-contractor conflicts
rather than to advocate the owner's point of view as much
as possible. Thus, with regard to contractor selection,
the BRA is content to furnish a list of contractors who
meet official insurance requirements, without any informa-
tion about the quality of their work. Secondly, the
level of work supervision which is actually accomplished
is felt by many owners to be superficial and ineffective,
15in terms of thi)e frequency and nature of inispecotions.
To be sure, this probleI has to do with manpow.er shortages
and the overwheling amount of paperwork which consumes
much of the specialist's time. But the priorities which
determine the specialist's work schedule also reflect the
underlying posture of passivity which se ems to be the rule
with regard to quality control in loan and grant rehabili-
tation.
Of course, contractors who prove consistently trouble-
somue are removed from the "approved" list--after the fact--
and the BRA does support owners in contractor disputes when
problems cone to its attention and circumstances warrant.
But it is th:e more sophisticated or affluent owner who
knows enough about rehabilitation and contractors to benefit
from this kind of service; and not surprisingly, the BRA
finds that ouners in this group are m.ost likely to complain
16
and seek assistace. The same level of service does not
Meet the needs of lower income or less sonhbisticated
owners, particularly the elderly grant recipients--who
iay not even re.alize that the specified kind of stove was
not installed or that verbal agreements with the contractor
are not enforceable. And to an owner unfamiliar with
the names on the PIRA's "approved" list, the telephone
directory is equally as useful. iinally, owners in
this group often regard the BRA as an enemy rather than
an ally and may be hesitant to complain about work quality.17
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In effect, the BRA's failure to pZlaxy a more active and
supporting role in this regard has worked to.reinforce
the differential distribution of rehab benefits that
is likely to exist in the abseiice of public intervention.
Moreover, there are indications that the BRA has
pursued its own interest in achieving rehabilitation volume
at the expense of quality rehab on more than one occa-
sion, by supporting contractors when the work was less
than adequate. In one rather notorious South End case,
a low income owner was reportedly "pressuredll into
signing payment releases to a contractor who had used
two different color floor tiles, while the BRA still
held a list of unfinished items. In a similar Charles-
town episode, the owners described themselves as being
under continuous pr essure to "settle," despite the
fact that the contractor had installed a brand of sink
and dishwasher different from that specified in the work
write-up. In this instance, the owners, who were articulate
and knowledgeable, held out for what they wanted; but they
expressed the opinion that less experienced owners in their
position might well have been persuaded to settle for
poor workmanship.
It is of some interest that at least two reports on
loan and grant programs elsewhere in the country tend to
support these general findings. A General AccQunting Office
study on rehabilitation in urban renewal areas, covering
primar:Lly loan and 'rant inancing, found considerable
fault with the limited public supervisory role. More
than three-quarters of the rehabilitated properties
inspected by thie GAO on a sample basis were found to
be in violation of the required FRS standards, despite
their approval by local LPA's and, in some cases, by the
HUD regional office. 2 0  Secondly, a survey of loan
and grant rehabilitation by the Haddington Leadership
Organization, a Philadelphia conununity organization v/ith
considerable involvement in the renewal program for its
area, uncovered widespread dissatisfaction on the part.
of owners with the quality of rehabilitation work.21
HLO staff has cited "the contractor t s penchant for
duplicity," particularly with regard to less sophis-
ticated loan and grant recipients, and the local
redevelopmen1t authority's "overprotedtive attitude toward
the contractors" as the major sources of the problem. 2 2
Finally, many of the factors which contribute to
the unsatisfactory quality of rehabilitation work --e.g.
unpredictability of processing time and payment schedules,
and the limited number of participating contractors--may
also result in higher prices being charged for loan and
grant rehabilitation. While concrete evidence in support
of this contention is lacking, at least one case is known
where 312 rehab bids were far in excess of the cost of the
same work financed privately. In this instance, 312 con-
mail,
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tractors demnanded $10,000 and $18,000 for work which
was eventually done privately for $.5000.23
Whether cost inflation, to the extent that it exists,
actually allows loan and grant contractors to iake higher
profits with government financing is a matter open to
speculation. The profitability of loan and grant work
is presumed to vary widely; according to one estimate,
an-efficient contractor with low overhead might make as
much as 40, on a predictable job, and close to nothing
on an unpredictable one.
Finally, there are the usual allegations and suspi-
cions of collusion between the BRA and contractors, in
connection with "revolving" bidding patterns which seem
to give a particular contractor the low bid and another
the high bid at regular intervals. In any event, the
public role in cost control seevs, at best, ineffective,
and, at worst, somiewhat detrimental to the homeowner 's
interest.
In this connection, the interest expressed by a
number of loan recipients, particularly in Charlestown,
to act as general contractors for their own rehabilitation
work should be noted. The primary incentive is to cut costs
by eliminating the general contractor's profit. In practice,
while the proposal would seem to have some merit for owners
skilled in construction work, it is extremely difficult
for an owner to be hired even as a subcontractor on his
own btlilding. Investors on occasion succeed in hiring
their own corporate entities as general contractors, or
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vice-versa; but strict local insurance requirer.,ents
for general contractors undertaking loan or grant
rehabilitation seem to effectively preclude small
resident owners from this opportunity. 2 5
V Summary and Conclusion
The analysis of loan and grant rehabilitation
has shIovmI that the program is strongly influenced by
the polititcal-administrativo , sOeial, and housing
market texts in which it operates. The inajor find-
ings of the three case studies and the conclusions
which can be drawn from them are sununarized bel ow.
First, the loan and grant program has not been
widely used, in relation to private and conventional
forms of rehnbilitation financing. While tiis reflects,
in part , the relative affluence of most ownc.rs under-
taking rehab iitat ion in urban renewal nie ighbo rho ods,
it also suggests that the program has not reaced miany
of those in greatest need of rehabilitation assistance.
The fact that loans and grants have financed the highest
proportion of total area rehabilitation voltune in the
South End, where the program is serving an exclusive
constituency, merely emphasizes the lack of correlatioin
between loan and grant volume and need.
The analysis of owners receiving assistance shows
that onily the grant program has consistently extended
the benefits of rehabilitation to a group clearly in
need of rehabilitation subsidies. The population served
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by the progr'am, however, has boen severely restricted
by the cost and income limitations attached to grant funds.
312 loans, on the other hand, have come closest to reach-
ing a truly "needy" constituency only in Washington
Park, where late timing, rather than deliberate effort,
has been the key factor influencing this outcome. Charles-
town loan recipients, though far from affluent, are a
group with considerable rehabilitation ambitions who
have used 312 money primarily to extend the level of
rehabilitation which they might otherwise have tmdertaken.
And in the South End, the loan program has served largely
a sophisticated and affluent group, whose members have
traditionally benefitted from rehabilitation.
Within the bounds established by federal laws and
regujations, the popul ation served by 312 loans largely
reflects the economo and social forces prevailing in
each rehabilitation area. Thus in the South End, the
high rehab costs associated with severely deteriorated
bui-ldings, the opportunities presented by a changing market,
and the presence of owners with the capacity and desire
to take advantage of these trends have conbined to pro-
duce an exzclusivC constituency. In Charlestown, aspira-
tions for social status and conavenience, as well as the
existence of market factors permitting the desired level
of rehab, have pushed an ambitious group of owners to
the fore, And in ashington Park, the forces which led
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more abitious and affluent owners to rehabilitate under
other forms of financing. early in the program by default
also produced the constituency which was left to receive 312
loans.
Con-versely, the loan program--and the grant program,
to a lesser extent-has failed to overcome many of the
ecoromic anId social factors traditionally excluding low
and modorate income owners fro;m the benefit of rehabili-
tation. Some owners for ihom grant a istaice is inade-
quate still cannot afford 312 loans. Antagonism toward
the BRA or reluctance to change traditional life styles
have prevenited others from obtaining assistance. Especially
in the South End, 312 loans have failed to mitigate the
rehab problems of large groups, i.e. the lodging house
o'wMners. In fact, the difficulties of rehabilitation for
this group may even have been reinforced by the administra-
tive complexities involved in 312 lodging house rehabilitation.
Finally, the constituency selection dictated by
ecoomic and social factors has been rireforced by the
BRA's policy of first-come, first-served rehabilitation
assistance and by its advocacy of ",gutsy rehab." Only
in Washington Park, where there was little choice of
constituency, has the BRA been forced to settle for a
less ambitious and resourceful group of loan recipients.
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With regard to rehabilitation 0ot, the a ieve-
ments of the grant progar sugst ha ro ar avt
loas t some builings which can be mae liabl , A; m-;ini
expense. The cost of 312 loan rehabilitation, on the
other hand, has been surpris ingly high in two of the
three areas This indicates, first, the substantial amount
of work rec uired to bring old buildings into basic code
comp:-lance, espcially in the South End where "changes of
occupancy"' arle inolved Equall irportant nowever, high
costs also reflect the level of rehabilitation well beyond
code standards which is being undertaken with 312 financing.
In fact, in m;any South End buildings, the level of modern-
ization approaches luxury rohabilitation and/or total
reconstruction. While building conditions are also rele-
vant in this regard, the economiic capacities and social
aspirations of owners doing the work are also a critical
factor.
Once again, the BR.1A's emrphasis on "gutsy rehab" has
operated to reinforce these tendencies wherever feasible.
Only in Washington Park, where neither the housing market
context nor the economic and social situations of 312
borrowers favored high cost rehabilitation, was it possible
to keep the level and cost of rehab work to a minimum.
The level and cost of rehabilitation being achieved
with loans antd grants has important economic and social
consequence for low andi moderate income tenants livng in
the tIree n eighbor h od, s On the one hand, it seems probable
79
that the fully subsidized, miniu-level rehabilitation
finIced by 115 grants has not iriposed costs on existing
tenants' (to the limited extent that grants' have been used
in ten anL-ccupied bcildings ) Similarly, 312 loan reha-
bilitation in Washing~on Park probably has not excluded
most indigenous tonaits from the benefits of rehabilitation
-- although social conflicts between owners and tenants
may have led to rehab exclusion in somI e cSase In
Charlestown, on the other hand, the econom of high-
cost 312 rehabilitation has probaly s inificantd
the supply of low and mUoderate rent housing, at least
in investor-owned buildirigs . And wile uniquo own
tenant relatior ships may have mitigated the consequences
of rehab temporarily for tenants in resident-owned
buildings, the long run impact on the area s low and
moderate income hotsing supply coutld be substantial,
Fiinally, i the South End 312 ILoan have to s;orme
extert furhered the econom and social forces facili--
tating overs ion of low and oderate incoe ho us ng
resources for iddle and upper income use To this degree,
the programa has operated to impose substantial costs on
the area's low aid moderate :incomej tenants, Thuis far,
the minimal use of leased housing in conjunction with 312
rehabilitation has done little to counteract these trends.
The higher level rehab norm established by the
majority of 312 owners -- as well as by owners using other
forr-s of rehabilitation financing--may ultimnately impose
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costs on lower income owner occupants as well. This
could occur througji a corresponding increase in assessed
values and taxes which could drive existing owners from
the area as surely as displac ement.
Finally, the extent to l;hich oan andl grant recipi-
ents have benefitted from the sjpecial nature of public
interve nti on in the rehabilitationi procoss has been linited
by sliow application procssing, vralue conflicts associated
with work write-ups, and the superficial level of cost
and quality control. in fact, certain features of the
program may operate to intensify problems typically
associated with rehabilitation, particularly in regard
to the cost and quality of work. The benefits to loJan and
grant r ecipien tI have also been somwha unevenly dais-
tribited in favor of the more affiuent and sopistiated
of the owaers receiving assistance--largly because of
the BRA's pattern of overselling and undersrvicing.
Ditermeg of the basic assumption underlying Boston 's
neighborhood renewal strategy--that rehabilitation would
serve and benefit existing, largely low; and moderate income,
area residents--the loan and grant experience indicates the
gap between promise and real:ity. Original assumptions
about minimal rehabilitation and the widespread availability
and use of liberal financing aids have not been validated
in practice, at least in two of the three rehabilitation
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neighborhoods. This- largely reflects the failure of
original plans to take into account the various housing
market, social, arid political-administrative forces at
work in these areas--some of which were perhaps unknown
at the time.
As a result of these forces, the very program designed
to maximize rehabilitation benefits for those most likely
to be threatened by rehab exclusion has served this purpose
only to a limiited extent. Instead, the program has worked
to facilitate the depletion of low and moderate income
housing resources, both in the South End, in the short
run, and in Charlestown,, in the long run. And it seems-
reasonable to suggest that the extent to which the loan
and grant program has failed in this regard reflects
rather critically on the ability of the entire rehabilitation
program to make good on its initial assumptions,
Ilications
The analysis has stressed that the forces shaping
the ipact of the loan and grant program--and particularly
the distribution of rehabilitat;ion costs and benefits
resulting from its use-are far broader than the program
itself. This does not imply, however, that the program
should be ignored or abandoned in the absence of more basic
economic and social changes. For the imiediate future , it
suggests the need for program re-orientation so that the
forces which exclude low and moderate inco:e g;roups from
the benefit; of improved hous:ig can be ti.ted, rather
than reinforced, to tie greatest possible extent, Even
within the limits of existing federal laws and regulations
goverring the loan and grant program, there are a number
of ways in which this can be done locally, Somc of
these deserve brief mention here, although the following
list of proposed changes is by no means exhaustive and
deals with only a few of the issues raised by this study.
The point is merely to suggest a general future direction
with the program in Boston might take, or which community
groups in renewal neighborhoods might begin to organize
around.
The BRA has already taken the first step, by assign-
ing priority status to low and moderate income omners and
to investors comitd to the use of some leased housing.
This should be s treng {thened by~ maingl?~ the disensationI
of loan funds to any investor conditional upon the use
of leasod hosing,. and by incr0eas ing t 0roportion f
leased units required to at Ieast 2/3. While this proposal
would conflict with present Poston Housing Authority regu-
lations limiting the proportion of leased units to 1/3
in small buildings, special allowances could certainly
be made for 312 rehabilitation. Given the housing problems
facing low and moderate income residents in renewal
neighborhoods, there is little justification for the use
of 312 funds to subsidize any rehabilitation for middle
and npper inc ome groups.
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Secondlyy there shouId be local controls on the
level of rehabilitation which can.be achieved by either
resdont- or n vCstor-oGners in conj unction with 312
re hab:iitatio n This might be accomplished through local
cost or work liitations which are more stringent than
those pi-ovid ed by federal regulat io ens. Restrictions
of this n2ature would preclude imore affluent resident-
owners from doing the kind of rehabilitation which irmposes
substantial costs on low income tenants and would also
keep investors within the range of roasonable leased
housing subsidlies. Alternatively, or perhaps addi tionally,
a system of rent controls similar to those applying
to other federally-subsidized buildings might be established.
Authority for local control over rehab levels and rents
in 312 buildings might be found in the previously noted
federal limitation on above-code lvol rehabilitation
and rent increases beyond the means of area residents (p.13).
On the issue of cost and quality control, it should
be poKssible to establish community arbitrat.ioni boards
with binding authority, to resolve owner-contractor or
owner-BRA disputes. A system of this sort has been
est ablished. in Philadelphia, although the exact nature
of its mandate is at this point unclear. In addition,
area residents in at loast one Philadelphia rehabilitation
neighborhood have instituted a community inspection system
in order to certify the work of contractors and approve
them for comununity use--another reform which app.ears useful
8in- terms of aiding less experienced owners.
Finally, with regard to the issue of arssive
advocacy of the interests of low and moderate income resi-
dents, the possibility of contracting the entire loan
and grant operation to a connaunity organization representing
such groups should be considered. The mistrust and resent-
mient toward the BRA which many indigenous residents have
accumulated over the -years is a strong barrier to more
extensive use of the progrwa by these owners. And the
loan and grant cxperience to date has not subs tantially
disproved the charge of bias of which the agency has
long been accused. Control by such a community group
would facilitate the -adoption and s t rict enforcement
of the policies listed above, some of which run counter
to the BRAi's entrenched value system, In fact, it is
probable that a total shift in program orientation will
never be accomplished short of such a radical change in
program control as the shift to conumunity sponsorship
implies.
On the other hand, from a community organization4
point of view, the benefits of assuming responsibility for
loan and grant administration would have to be weighed
carefully against the costs. The likelihood that conmnunity
control might substantially alter tie existing distribution
of costs and benefits resulting from loan and grant rehabili-
tation, in terms of population served and costs achieved
could vary considerably from area to area, In the South
End, for example, the high. cost of code compliance -regard-
less of who undertakes it--could be a serious liability
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for a group advocating the interests of low income
residents. On the other hand, control by this kind of
organization in an area with somewhat more favorable
economic and social conditions, such as Charlestown,
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Source: Compiled from BRA site office summary records
*Includes loan-g rant "corbos" * *Includes 1 6-unit buildin-
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Table VII
Cost Analysis for Selected 312 Loans,










































































































































*Cost estimate does not
overhead allowance (20.
include contractor s profit-and-) and is not the actual rehab cost.









































































































































*Cost estiiiate does not include contractor's profit-and
overhead allowance (20,) and is not the actual rehab cost.
Source: Selected work write-ups and cost breakdown forms.
1Table VIII
Gross Monthly Rents Before and After
Rehabilitation, for Selected 312 Properties
CHARLESTOWN
Owner-Occupied Inve st or-Owned































































































































*$20 adjustment made between contract and gross rentals.
**Proposed, not actual.









































































* $20 adjustmient made between contract and gross rentals.
**Proposed, not actual rents.
***Actual rents.
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